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AB STRACT 
Ten years of procompetitive regulation at the Federal 
Communications Commission and the pending divestiture of AT&T to 
settle the decade-old govermnent antitrust case against the company 
have sown the seeds for a fundamental restructuring of the 
telec ommunications industry. Competition, though as yet vigorous only 
for a handful of services and devices, is nevertheless healthy and 
growing. The salient regulatory questions are the extent to which the 
industry can become competitive, the rate at which the AT&T monopoly 
will erode, and how regulation can ease and speed the transition to a 
more efficient industry structure. The purpose of this paper is to 
lay out the role of the FCC during the next decade or two as the 
industry becomes increasingly competitive but AT&T continues to have a 
dominant position in long distance telephone and certain key elements 
of the equipment market. 
THE FUTUR E OF TELECOMMUNICATION S REGULATION* 
Roger G. Noll 
California Institute of Technology 
The deregulation mood of the late 1970s and the pending 
dissolution of the Bell System as part of the settlement of the 
government's antitrust suit against AT&T have caused some significant 
changes in the content of the ongoing debate over telecommunications 
policy. Perhaps most significantly, devotees of the communications 
industry can no longer complain that their favorite hobby horse is 
receiving less attention than it deserves in the policy arena. 
Telecommunications broadly defined to include computing is basking in 
the sunlight of substantial attention, especially in Congress, but 
also in the courts and the Department of Justice. Of course, this too 
shall pass away, but in the meantime, there is some chance that the 
posture of public policy for the next decade or two is now up for 
grabs, and that it will be decided in a relatively open manner that is 
informed by evidence and analysis. This means that it is time for 
scholars to put up or shut up on what their work has to say about the 
proper role of public policy in the new regime. 
*
I am indebted to William Comanor, Nina W. Cornell, and Ithiel 
de Sola Pool for helpful comments and suggestions on an earlier 
version of this paper. 
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The second major change in the public dialogue is that there 
is no longer any serious question about whether competition or 
franchised , regulated monopoly is the long-term structure of the 
industry for which public policy should be aiming. In contrast to the 
situation a few years back, all the major players -- except the 
military, state regulators and some die-hard engineers -- seem now to 
believe that in the future the telecommunications business will be 
more or less competitive. The main issue of concern -- and over which 
rousing battles can still be waged � is how to get there, how fast to 
move, and what, if anything, will remain as a "residual" of natural 
monopoly that will persist. 
This paper provides no definitive answers to these questions. 
Indeed, the state of science is such that to provide them is probably 
well beyond our abilities. Instead, my purpose will be limited to two 
general lines of analysis. The first will be to make some 
observations about the nature of the problem of deciding upon a 
regulatory policy for the rapidly-developing telecommunications 
industry. These will not lead to definitive conclusions about 
structue, but they will, I hope, lead to the second general topic : 
what is the domain in which the reasonable policy options can be found 
� and what ideas are probably doomed to failure? 
The paper leads to a rather heretical conclusion for these 
days. It is not yet time to close down the Federal Communications 
Commission; there is indeed a role for economic regulation in 
telcommunications. But there is a great danger lurking in the dark 
halls of Congress : that the FCC will be retained for the wrong 
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purpose. The key issue is to have the FCC regulate AT&T for what is 
likely to be a relatively long (e.g. a decade or two) transition 
period in a manner that allows market forces to work, but not to get 
carried away into the business of switching from the pro-AT&T 
protectionism that characterized the agency for the first twenty years 
after World War I I  to an anti-AT&T protectionism of inefficient 
competitors in the name of "competition by numbers" or "promotion of 
small business." 
CHARACTERIST ICS OF THE INDUSTRY 
The development of rational policy in the telcommunications 
sector requires as a first step a realistic view of the basic 
technical and economic facts about where it is and where it is likely 
to go. Until the 1970s, the telecommunications industry was 
deceptively simple. Virtually all of the capital investment in 
telecommunications was for a single technical purpose: to provide 
two-way, narrow bandwidth communications links of a given technical 
quality that interconnected literally everyone in the country. There 
were exceptions to this generalization -- telegraph and broadcast 
distribution systems being most notable. But the basic technical 
structure was remarkably homogeneous in its design and purpose. 
Lurking behind this s�plicity was diversity in several 
different forms. First, the standard quality, four kilohertz two-way 
connections could be provided by a variety of technical means. 
Second, customers put these connections to a variety of uses, leading 
to a wide array of devices that were developed to connect to the 
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system. AT&T, as the dominant firm in the industry, tried to cover as 
many of these bases as it could, but eventually this technical 
diversity in both the production technology and the use of the system 
led to competition. Its form initially was that companies other than 
AT&T began coming up with technical ideas about producing or using the 
standard service that were different from the avalanche of ideas 
pouring forth from AT&T's R&D program. 
The rise of television foretold of still another way that 
competition could rear its head. In seeking a method for distributing 
programming nationally in real time, the television industry sought a 
different set of technical characteristics in the network. While this 
was relatively easily accommodated, it was not always to be so. The 
general point is this. As uses of telecommunications proliferated, as 
the costs per unit of capacity of telecommunications networks 
declined, and as income and demand rose, subcategories of users sensed 
incentives to form coalitions to demand a new network that was 
designed to suit their special technical desiderata. Rather than 
design peripheral technologies to fit into a homogeneous system, 
entrepreneurs began looking for ways to change the design of the 
telcommunications system to satisfy subcategories of users. 
The stance of the Federal Communications Commission with 
respct to these developments has evolved dramatically since the mid-
1950s. Initially, the FCC sought to maintain the homogeneous, single 
network. It regarded telecommunications as a natural monopoly, and 
looked askance at any attempt to introduce competition into any phase 
of it. In the 1960s, the Commission entered a second phase, best 
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illustrated by its position in the Specialized Common Carrier decision 
and the first Computer Inquiry. In this phase, the Commission was 
likely to look with favor upon entrants seeking to provide a new 
service. Competition was perm itted in the form of specialied networks 
providing a distinct technical service in some identifiably different 
way than the services being provided by AT&T. But the FCC clearly 
regarded all this as a separate � indeed, peripheral � activity in 
comparison with "standard" telecommunications service, which it saw as 
continuing to be a natural monopoly that not only needed to be 
regulated, but that needed to be protected from competitive erosion. 
Eventually this policy fell for the illogic of its basis. The 
Commission simply could not develop a rational, consistent boundary 
between the categories of services that ought to be provided by a 
regulated monopoly and those that ought to be open to competitors. 
The spectrum of technical possibilities in both production and use of 
telecommunications was continuous. Any attempt to slice it up into 
discrete boxes not on ly was arbitrary, but created incentives for 
firms in the industry to pile up their entrepreneurial activities on 
the boundaries to capture as much as possible of the continuum for 
themse 1 ves. 
By the time of the Second Computer Inquiry, the FCC had all 
but abandoned the notion of a well-defined, fixed domain of the 
"monopoly" service. On the surf ace, the "separate subsidiary" policy 
looks like the old policy of line-drawing between monopoly and 
competition. The idea is that if the "monopoly carrier" -- e.g. Ma 
Bell � wants to compete with another company, it must do so through a 
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subsidiary that is tota l ly separated in an accounting and a managerial 
sense from its monopoly activities. The new departure is that the 
concept of the monopoly service is elastic. By also pursuing a policy 
of permitting resale of AT&T services, the FCC is trying to set up a 
process whereby the marketplace, not the telephone company, decides 
which markets wil l be competitive and which monopolized. This 
represents the third phase in the evolution of the FCC, for if the 
separate subsidiary and resale policies work and if there is no long-
run natural monopoly in telecommunications, in the long run the FCC 
will have nothing left to call a monopoly service -- and thus nothing 
left to be regulated. Although people associated with the FCC can 
surely speak for themselves, I suspect that many of them � especially 
the dominant group during the Ferris era at the Commission -- believe 
in the essential correctness of this long-run expectation about the 
. d 1 in ustry. 
There exists no definitive proof of either the existence or 
the nonexistence of a core natural monopoly in telecommunications. 
The "existence" side of the argument relies upon a demonstration of 
scale and scope economies and the projection that new technologies 
will continue to make them a dominating influence. The trouble is 
that these arguments are necessary but not sufficient to support the 
case for natural monopoly. If, in order to capture these economies, 
the technological characteristics of the network have to be less 
heterogeneous than the spectrum of technological characteristics users 
might want, it might be more efficient to forego some of these 
economies and have more than one system, each being tailored to the 
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particular characteristics valued most by a subset of users. This 
implies a differentiated communications product, and a long-run market 
structure of either oligopoly or monopolistic competition. And, of 
course, in the equilibrium market structure in either case, firms will 
exhibit the presence of scale and/or scope economies that are not 
fully captured, even if economic welfare would be sacrificed if 
regulators limited entry so that they were captured. 
The best arguments on the "nonexistence" side of the argument 
are empirical : there is a readily observable spectrum of highly 
differentiated demands for communications services owing to 
developments in computer technology, automated sensing and control 
devices, and other forms of nonvoice communication, and in any case 
the costs of telecommunications facilities have become so low that 
giving up integration economies is not very expensive • 
In any case, for the sake of further analysis, I will 
assume that there really is no long-run natural monopoly in 
telecommunications. I include in this technical assumption the 
absence of a long-run monopoly in local service in the sense that 
differentiated technical demands may be most efficiently served by 
separate systems, perhaps interconnected to the "plain old telephone 
system" (POTS), or perhaps not. This imagines technologies like 
cellular radio, cable television, and high performance networks for 
computer services gradually moving into substantial competitive 
overlap with POTS. In this milieu, the pertinent question for 
regulatory policy is how best to manage the transition to a 
competitive market. Subsidiary questions that need to be addressed 
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before solving the transition problems are whether the market would 
converge to a competitive arrangement naturally; if so, how fast; and 
what, if anything, can regulators do to enhance the prospects for, and 
speed of achieving, competition. 
Whatever the long-term equilibrium configuration of the 
industry, the market we inherit is hardly competitive. Although new 
technologies may make local service competition feasible, now it is 
virtually entirely provided by local franchised monopolies. AT&T 
operating companies have held approximately 85 percent of this market 
for years, and any movement in this fraction has been due to 
differences in population growth rates among franchise territories 
rather than any serious development of competition. 
In the interexchange market, AT&T's market share has dropped 
slightly - from 85 percent in 1970 to about 80 percent in 1980.2 The 
major beneficiaries of the decline have not been the firms that 
constitute the competitive fringe. Their share has hovered between 2 
and 3 percent throughout the period since 1970. Nearly all of the 
growth in market share is accounted for by independent telephone 
companies. The main exception to this generalization is private line 
service, in which the share of the competitive fringe has grown from 
about 1 percent in 1970 to about 10 percent in 1980; however, AT&T's 
share still remains near 85 percent, although it was 94 percent in 
1970. 
The equipment market has experienced substantial growth in 
competition in some areas. Manufacturing arms of companies that also 
own operating systems are don.inant in producing the components of the 
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network: transmission and switching equipment. But competition has 
been more successful in terminal equipment, especially PBX and 
decorator telephone equipment. On the order of 600 companies have 
registered at the FCC as manufacturers of terminal equipment, and for 
some of the less expensive items the market shares of companies who 
are not in the business of operating systems have as much as half the 
market. 
High market shares do not automatically produce an ability to 
engage successfully in monopolistic practices. Whether a high share 
produces monopolistic gains is a complicated issue to which we will 
turn. Before proceeding with that analysis, two additional 
preliminaries are necessary, for they affect the choice of market 
strategies by a dominant firm. One is the nature of the regulatory 
process, which is the sub ject of the next section. The other is the 
structure of the dominant firm itself, a matter to which we now turn. 
In almost every facet of telecommunications, the dominant firm 
is AT&T - and, for years to come, will be the entities that will be 
created by the AT&T divestiture. The crux of the AT&T antitrust case3 
was that the structure of the company in combination with its 
regulated status gave it the incentive and the opportunity to engage 
in anticompetitive practices. The settlement focuses on the 
connection between the operating companies and the remaining parts of 
AT&T that can be regarded as providing "inputs " - the manufacturing 
activities of Western Electric and the interconnection services of 
Long Li nes, as well as managerial and financial functions in the 
holding company. The local franchised monopolies in POTS, goes the 
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argument, provided a captive market for equipment and interconnection; 
moreover, a single company that had 85 percent of the market in local 
POTS which was relatively immune from competitive entry could, if made 
independent, create monopsony problems for independent interconnection 
and equipment companies. Hence the genesis of the idea not only to 
sever the connection between the operating companies and the rest of 
the system, but also to create several independent operating 
companies. 
The first step removes the incentive for operating companies 
to buy exclusively from AT&T entities that provide equipment and 
interconnection. The second protects against potential monopsony 
problems in the equipment market. It does not remove all of the 
potential for monopsony problems in the interconnect market, because 
interconnection is a point-to-point service either within one 
operating company or between two. But there does not appear to be any 
iron-clad insurance policy against this problem as long as there are 
local franchised monopolies. 
The settlement does not address the connection between AT&T 
Long Lines, which provides interconnect service, and the manufacturing 
and research components of AT&T. If the assumption about long-run 
equilibrium being competitive is true, then this does not matter much 
in the long run: a vertically integrated entity will survive or fail, 
once equilibrium is attained, on the basis of its efficiency. But 
meanwhile, the structure of AT&T will continue to be one in which a 
regulated, franchised monopoly in message toll telephone service (and, 
temporarily at least, some other interconnect services) is corporate ly 
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connected to an essentially unregulated manufacturing and research 
entity. To the extent that this arrangement created a problem prior 
to the antitrust case with respect to the local operating companies, 
it could continue to create the same problem in the interconnection 
market. Whether it will do so turns on the crucial assumption of this 
form of divestiture: that the interconnect market has sufficient 
competitive forces operating in it that the structure of what remains 
of AT&T as a vertically integrated entity does not, or will not long, 
continue to provide incentive and opportunity for profitable 
anticompetitive behavior. 
One element of checking this assumption is to review in broad 
strokes the nature of federal regulation. This will provide the final 
preliminary element before we can launch into an analysis of the 
optimal corporate strategy of what remains of AT&T in the new regime, 
whether this has potential for inefficiencies owing to the retardation 
of competition, and what, if anything, can be done about whatever 
problems can be identified. 
THE FEATURES OF COMMUNICATIONS REGULAT ION 
The subtle, ultimate purposes of regulation are a matter of 
some dispute. The Progressivist notion that economic regulation is 
supposed to lop off some of the monopoly prof its that utilities might 
otherwise earn is now regarded with considerable skepticism, and I 
will dutifully pay my respects to this literature by citing it.4 
Surely the prospects for the creation of rents by political actions is 
an element of regulatory policy, so the Progressive ideal is 
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Pollyannish at best; however, as Ralph Nader's success has effectively 
demonstrated, there is probably more to politics than producer 
. . 5 protectLonLsm. 
In the case of the telecommunications industry, regulation bas 
often been protectionist. Even in the recent era of procompetitive 
attitudes and deregulation, it remained for the courts to overthrow an 
FCC decision that prevented competition in intercity long-distance 
telephone business.6 And despite the procompetitive mood in 
Washington that developed in the 1970s, the concept of a protected 
franchised monopoly for local service is surely alive and well in most 
states. Nevertheless, there are counterexamples to the generalization 
that telecommunications regulation is always protectionist. In any 
case, there is certainly good evidence that telecommunications 
companies do not earn full monopoly revenues. Both monopoly theory 
and the theory of a regulated monopolist subject to a constraint on 
the rate of return predict that companies will operate in the elastic 
portion of the demand curve; however, studies of the demand for 
telecommunications service normally produce estimates of the long-run 
demand elasticity at current rates of outp ut that are less than unity 
at peak periods.7 This suggests that federal and state regulation 
succeeds in producing prices and profits below the levels that would 
result from unrestrained monopoly. 
What regulators have not done is introduce much rationality 
into the price structure, or control the ability of a regulated 
monopoly to inhibit competition. Because regulation controls prof its 
by basing profits on some measure of total cost, the regula ted 
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monopoly is especially fond of keeping as big a share of the market as 
possible, even if that means retaining services that are unprofitable. 
Spinoffs of losing operations can reduce profits, for by reducing the 
total costs of the firm, a spinoff also reduces the total revenues 
allowed it. If prices for individual services are not closely tied to 
costs, a spinoff may force lower prices in profitable services that 
bad been subsidizing the unprofitable ones. 
A vertically integrated, regulated monopoly has several 
strategies for foreclosing economically warrented competition: 
predatory pricing, denial of interconnection, creation of technical 
incompatibilities between its monopoly services and the services or 
equipment offered by competitors, and use of the administrative 
process to increase the costs and time required for entry. Throughout 
the 1970s, the FCC seemed genuinely to want to promote competition Ln 
some areas of telecommunications, yet never seemed to develop an 
effective, coherent, and rational set of policies to achieve it. 
Indeed, many have concluded from this effort that AT&T is essentially 
unregulatable with respect to its ability to prevent or significantly 
d . . 8 to retar competLtLve entry. 
Total deregulation at least has one appealing attraction. It 
would remove the incentives created by regulation for AT&T to retain 
in the monopoly system things for which it really has no efficiency 
basis for wanting to retain. But it would still end up with monopoly 
returns in the monopoly business, and with a possibility of a large 
market share that was undeserved on efficiency grounds in products and 
services that use the monopolized services as an input. Monopoly 
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creates an incentive for downstream vertical integration, for a firm 
can then set internal transfer prices equal to marginal cost, rather 
than market price, and thereby g ain production efficiencies 
unavailable to competitors in the downstream market.9 The appeal to 
the FCC of the proposal for continued monopoly regulation of parts of 
AT&T, combined with separate subsidiaries in competitive markets, is 
the belief that it can prevent some of the problems associated with 
monopoly while letting the technical proficiency of AT&T be loosed 
upon the full spectrum of communications services. The key to this 
proposal is whether its optimistic attitude about the effectiveness of 
regulation to inhibit anticompetitive practices is correct. If not, a 
third alternative waits in the wings: prohibition of AT&T's 
participation in competitive markets, a position espoused by some in 
Congress.10 
To begin to get some insight into the practical issues that 
underpin this policy choice, it is useful to review why a regulatory 
agency, regardless of how well meaning, would be better able to limit 
monopoly returns than to prevent anticompetitive behavior, assuming 
that it wanted to do both. There are many technical reasons why this 
might be so, but here the focus will be on a few that are likely to be 
especially important. 1 1  
One is the difference in informational requirements for 
setting price level ceilings versus designing an optimal price 
structure. The former requires an estimate of total cost and an 
assessment of whether the regulated entity is using "best " technology . 
Ambiguities arise in both cases, but if the possibility for monopoly 
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returns is very great, the ability of the firm to capture them all 
through gold-plating, Averch-Johnson effects, continued operations in 
unprofitable markets , and perquisites for executives will be limited 
if regulators are at all serious. For one thing, the beh avior of the 
equities in the regulated firm will give away a move that captures a 
major new, untapped source of monopoly rents. For another, regulators 
can make checks � albeit crude � on substitutions of one kind of 
input for another, or the extent of excess capacity in the system. 
To regulate the price structure requires two additional kinds 
of information: service-specific demand elasticities (including 
cross-elasticities among all services) and marginal costs. Tools that 
are crude, but nevertheless succeed in preventing gross monopoly 
rents, can still be too crude to provide much help in deciding whether 
a given move by the regulated firm is a legitimate competitive 
response or an anticompetitive, predatory act. The reason is that 
fairly small differences in price in a competitive market can have a 
very large effect on market share. A regulator will determine whether 
a monopolist's price response is legitimate by comparing it to some 
measure of cost � in principle, to marginal cost or to some Ramsey 
departure from marginal cost based upon demand elasticities. In 
telecommunications, prices among competitors are usually within a few 
tens of percents of each other. In the best of circumst ances, 
econometric estimates of demand elasticities and marginal costs rarely 
have a confidence interval that is tighter than this, and therefore 
that can confidently distinguish between an optimal, legitimate 
competitive response and an anticompetitive, noncompensatory one. In 
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the real world of regulation, accounting practices have not been 
developed to make the circumstances of estimation very good, and 
regulated firms (either monopolists or competitors) h ave no incentive 
to institute data collection methods that make good cost and demand 
information a matter of public record. 
A similar argument pertains to the problems regulators face in 
ascertaining whether a firm selects the most efficient technology. If 
operating in the inelastic portion of demand, the firm has a reason to 
make additions to cost categories that are included in the c alculation 
of allowed profits. In rate of return regulation, this means 
substituting capital for operating expenses. Substitution of capital 
for operating inputs has another effect: it lowers short-run marginal 
costs, and hence the floor regulators would place on a competitive 
price response. Assuming that small but not large inefficiencies can 
slip through, a capital substitution that adds a small chunk of excess 
profits can also be decisive in determining whether a firm can respond 
successfully to an entrant without bringing down the wrath of either 
regulators or antitrust officials. 
The preceding are the major sources of the skepticism of 
people in regulatory agencies � even the ones who are good economists 
-- in adopting fancy pricing rules derived from economic theory for 
establishing the price structure of a regulated firm, and especially 
for establishing the ground rules for a regulated monopolist that is 
engaged in battle with an unregulated competitive fringe. Theory is 
simply ahead of practice in this regard, 
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Another important difference between regulating overall 
profits and regulating the price structure in a partially competitive 
environment has to do with the administrative process itself. The due 
process requirements in regulation create built-in biases for the 
status quo; things can be changed only after the procedural, 
evidentiary and substantive requirements are met. A regulated 
monopolist must establish the validity of new rates; however, a 
potential entrant must establish th at it has a right to enter (if the 
agency has asserted jurisdiction) or that it has been treated unjustly 
by the monopolist. This gives an entrenched monopolist an opportunity 
to raise the entry costs of potential competitors � or to engage in 
strategic use of the administrative process for anticompetitive 
purposes� simply by exercising its full spectrum of legal rights.12 
Finally, the role of research in a regulated environment has 
quite different implications for the two kinds of problems. If 
regulators have difficulty deciding whether a given telecommunications 
technology is most efficient for its intended use, this problem is a 
picnic compared to the difficulty of assessing whether a research 
program is the right size, and directed at the right technical 
problems and opportunities. If overall profit control is all that 
matters, the problem is not quite so difficult, as long as research 
and development costs are !!Q!. allowed into the rate base for 
calculating allowed profits, but are treated as an operating cost. In 
a world of natural monopoly, regulators need to worry about cost-
increasing innovations (e.g. picture phones and random orbit 
satellites) , but can probably catch the outrageous ones, if not all. 
In a world of some monopoly and some competitive fringe, the problem 
is severe, for the issue of cross-subsidization and other strategic 
uses of innovation for anticompetitive purposes becomes important. 
How does a regulator know whether the AT&T tax on operating company 
revenues for supporting research and development was being used 
primarily to finance excessive effort on improving technology at the 
competitive fringe, as contrasted to there simply being more ripe 
research opportunities in long-distance tran smission and terminal 
equipment than elsewhere? Obviously, the regulator cannot know the 
answer to this question. 
DOMINANT F IRM STRATEGY IN THE NEW REGIME 
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The purpose of this section is to explore the profit­
maximizing strategy of a dominant firm in a market like that of 
telecommunications. The object is to identify incentives and 
opportunities for monopoly practices within the range of plausible 
regulatory structures for the industry, from instant deregulation to 
partial regulation with separate competitive subsidiaries to total 
regulation with and without participation in competitive markets. 
Before proceeding, a word of caution is in order. Obviously, this 
topic cannot be approached with the identity of the players being made 
anonymous. AT&T is the company we are talking about, and in some 
sense the analysis constitutes a kind of prediction about future 
market structure problems in the telecommunications business. 
Nevertheless, the business at hand is not to comment upon matters of 
business ethics or lawfulness. Business executives have a fiduciary 
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responsibility to do the best they can for stockholders; moreover, the 
definition of legality that matters is the one used by lawyers: what 
is legal is what you are acquitted of or not caught at, not what in 
principle obeys the philosophical spirit of the law. Here the focus 
is incentive and opportunity, not moral judgment. 
The first step in the analysis is to investigate the strategy 
of a dominant firm that is not subject to regulation and is situated 
like AT&T: it has a very large market share in almost everything, 
but, by hypothesis, it has no natural monopoly. What strategic 
possibilities are open to it? 
In order to answer this question, a prior one must be 
addressed. Whereas in principle there is a world of competitors ready 
to jump in, the question remains how fast they will enter, and how the 
speed of their entry depends upon the strategy of the dominant firm. 
This question has been the subject of a large body of theory in 
economics. Whereas this work provides numerous insights into how to 
think about the problem, there is as yet no general theory. What does 
exist is a series of special theories. No attempt will be made to 
survey them; instead, some central issues will be raised that are 
pertinent to the case of telecommunications. 
Presumably competitors enter a market because they believe it 
will be profitable. They observe prices charged by incumbent firms, 
and have an estimate (it may be subject to narrow or wide uncertainty) 
of the incumbent's costs. Both pieces of information are important, 
because the decision to enter will be based upon an expectation of 
what the incumbent will do when entry occurs, if anything. In 
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addition, the entrant knows its own costs. In general, these can 
include a start-up cost of getting into the business (e.g. 
transmitting to customers the possibility of getting a better deal, or 
winning approval from a regulatory authority that grants franchises, 
or even winning a court battle that requires the incumbent to sell the 
entrant some "bottleneck" input that is necessary to enter and compete 
effectively against the same firm in another market). In addition, 
there are costs related to the capacity and operations of the 
business. By hypothesis, there is no long-run natural monopoly in the 
industry; however, the cost function may exhibit some scale economies 
for small rates of output. In addition, the firm may face a cost 
penalty if it expands very fast . Capital markets may not supply it 
with unlimited capital at a constant, perfectly competitive interest 
rate, or its own management may have a maximum efficient rate of 
expansion, beyond which it faces a rising marginal cost of capacity in 
the short run, but not in the long run. 
Suppose an extreme case holds: that firms can enter and leave 
an industry instantaneously at any level of capacity with no cost 
penalty.13 Assume further that all firms have identical long-run cost 
functions that exhibit neither economies nor diseconomies of scale. 
In such a case, firms will instantly enter if price is the slightest 
bit above long-run marginal cost. The dominant firm can retain its 
market share, no matter how large, by immediately setting price equal 
to long-run marginal cost. No entry will occur and the market will 
appear to be monopolized, but no excess profits will be earned. 
"Potential competition" polices the market perfectly by promising 
severe and ins tantaneous punishment if the incumbent deviates ever so 
slightly from charging the equilibrium competitive price. 
21 
Although unrealistic, this extreme case is a useful place to 
start an analysis of the real world because it brings into focus the 
many ways in which results can be not quite so happy, and how a more 
complex strategy can develop for both the dominant firm and the 
potential entrants. Suppose first we introduce the notion that 
entrants face limits on the rate at which they can expand capacity 
without facing a cost penalty. For any given expectation about prices 
in the market over the life of an investment, an entrant can calculate 
an optimal initial capacity, and an optimal rate at which to expand. 
In general, higher prices will induce firms to bear greater cost 
penalties for faster expansion as the profit-maximizing entrant 
calculates the rate of capacity expansion that equates price with the 
long-run marginal cost of output. To the incumbent firm, a difficult 
choice must then be made: to set lower prices and retard entry, 
thereby earning less profit per unit on a larger market share, or to 
set higher prices that generate high profits per unit of output, but 
lead to a more rapidly declining market share. 14 This conceptual 
model seems particularly appropriate for the telecommuncations market, 
because of its enormous and elaborate capital requirements.15 Entry 
has normally begun with the construction of a specific capital plant 
for offering a specific service in a specific subset of markets, 
inducing the early fiction at the FCC that what was really going on 
was "new services" that offered, or should offer, no threat to the 
mainline natural monopoly service. This is how first telegraphy and 
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then telephony was introduced. 
Worth noting is that continued regulation of the monopoly firm 
will, if successful, force it into the lower price, higher market 
share strategy. To the extent continued regulation holds down prices, 
competitors will expand more slowly � and push back the boundary 
between monopoly and competition more deliberately. The potential 
problem with this policy is that it can easily be doomed through 
misinterpretation of its own success: will political leaders really 
believe that regulation is succeeding in making the market more like a 
competitive one (in the efficiency sense) by pursuing a strategy that 
sees slow erosion of AT&T's market share? Certainly one group � the 
entrants � is BQ!. going to think so. 
The second element of the entrant's costs is the initial fixed 
cost of getting into the business. This requires very little 
analysis. To the extent that entry costs are higher, the entry­
inducing price will also be higher. The entrant must be able to 
expect prices after entry that exceed average production costs and 
therefore recover the fixed cost of entry, or entry will not occur. 
Brock has examined one dimension of these entry barriers -- the 
straightforward financial cost (cash on the barrelhead) to get in. 
Another element, however, is delay. Both erecting and tearing down 
entry barriers may be quite inexpensive compared to the stakes in the 
market; however, if the entrant cannot get in until after the barrier 
is dismantled, brick by brick, the incumbent will have enjoyed the 
monopoly position for a longer period of time than might otherwise 
have been the case. Telecommunications can here borrow from the 
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experience in airline and trucking deregulation: let competitors in, 
and ask questions later. The trouble is that the issue is somewhat 
more complicated in telecommunications, where entrants will not enter 
simultaneously in all markets that they optimally should serve. They 
will seek to buy interconnection service in the gaps and equipment 
from AT&T as they complete the network. As a policy matter, AT&T will 
be subject to nondiscrimination rules and, of course, the possibility 
of someone making use of the resale provisions to arbitrage an attempt 
to engage in price discrimination. As a practical matter, though, 
this offers great opportunities for erecting entry barriers -- making 
close calls in a self-serving way that will take regulators and the 
courts years to unravel.16 Such is certainly the case in the 
principal interconnect issues of the 1970s regarding connection to the 
local loop of competitive suppliers of interconnect services or 
terminal equipment. 
A third element of the entrant's calculations about when and 
how fast to enter is expectations about the future price of the 
dominant firm. This issue has been a major focus of considerable 
research in recent years and, as most issues in economics having to do 
with expectations formulation, does not lead to very firm conclusions. 
But the issue is relatively easy to describe. The entrant, whether 
the only entrant or a member of a group, will expect the threat of 
entry to alter the pricing strategy of the incumbent firm. One 
possibility is predatory pricing: that the dominant firm will not 
nicely solve some differential equations about long-run pricing from 
some variant of the Gaskins model, but will punish the upstarts who 
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threaten to erode its market share. 
The rationale for a predatory pricing strategy is not just to 
teach the specific entrant a lesson, but to teach future potential 
entrants that it is bad policy to respond to the perception of a high 
price/cost margin anywhere in the dominant firm's domain. The so-
called "chain store paradox" develops the notion that even when the 
best strategy for the dominant firm would be to share the market with 
the entrant if one could assume no further entry in other markets 
later, the possibility of the latter can make it in the dominant 
firm's interest to behave "irrationally" by punishing the entrant in a 
way that is quite costly to the incumbent -- but that teaches others a 
lesson. 
Predatory pricing is one of the central issues of antitrust 
policy, and the subject of extensive work to develop "tests" for 
detecting it that boil down to measurable versions of whether price is 
above or below the appropriate marginal-cost concept.17 The 
difficulty is that strategic manipulations to provide means to avoid a 
rule are usually possible. If the test is price above short-run 
marginal costs, then spend a little extra to substitute capital for 
variable factors of production, and build a little excess capacity.18 
If the test is the relationship of price to long-run marginal cost, a 
dominant firm has an incentive to favor technologies that exhibit 
economies of scale and yield lower marginal costs but higher average 
costs at the competitive equilibrium than does the (more efficient) 
constant returns to scale technology. The difference in average costs 
at the monopoly price will then be the cost of the insurance policy 
against competitive entry, for the latter will provoke a perfectly 
legal predatory price reduction to long-run marginal cost. 
Regulation provides additional incentives for predatory 
pricing, as described above, because of its cost-based pricing 
methods. If cost allocation procedures among services are subject to 
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manipulation, losses in the market where a service is underpriced will 
be used to justify price increases in the regulated monopoly market, 
cushioning the firm against even the short-run losses of a predation 
strategy. The tactics are not much different than described above: 
structure the technical configuration of the firm so as to maximize 
fl "b"l" d" . . h 19 ex1 1 1ty to a JUSt to a compet1t1ve t reat. 
The idea behind the separate subsidiary proposal is that it 
makes this tactic much more difficult. This is probably true for the 
relatively clean cases of a competitive service that uses monopoly 
interconnection as an input. Whereas interconnection interrupt 
strategies may apply, even the crude accounting methods of regulators 
should catch any predation here that involves transference of some of 
the costs in the competitive market to the regulated market. But 
separate subsidiaries will not so constrain monopoly services that are 
close substitutes of competitive ones. Once again, regulators will 
run against the indistinct boundary between the two. The rational 
regulated monopoly will engage in pricing strategies that produce low 
prices for the services that are most likely to be the next in line 
for competitive entry, and high prices for the best protected. The 
vagaries of monopoly cost-allocation and demand-estimation problems 
will haunt this world as they have haunted the FCC for the past 
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fifteen years. 
The last area of strategy choice for the dominant firm is with 
respect to opportunities created by vertical integration. Divestiture 
does nothing to alter the incentive for AT&T Long Lines to continue to 
buy its equipment from Western Electric. Although Western Electric is 
not regulated, it probably makes sense to regard it as if it were. If 
AT&T earned monopoly profits of embarrassing proportions from Western 
by using high equipment prices to pass through the monopoly rent 
potential in service markets, it would be both obvious and not 
tolerated by regulators. At the same time, AT&T has an incentive to 
be integrated so as to expand the domain in which it can earn its 
regulated return. This is true even if excess profits are zero as 
long as expansion does not hurt the company in some way owing to 
unmanageable size; and managers and stockholders, all other things 
being equal, prefer larger companies to smaller ones. This will 
persist with separate subsidiaries as long as Western Electric is not 
a high-price producer. If Western is high-cost, of course, in markets 
for competitive inputs, it will not necessarily be high priced; it may 
instead cross-subsidize with higher prices for equipment used only by 
the monopoly service. As long as the cost cross-subsidy is small 
relative to the size of the monopoly service, this is not likely to be 
detected or to hurt the company financially. Again, to the extent 
Western Electric is properly regarded as regulated, there is a 
positive incentive to engage in this kind of pricing strategy, within 
limits. 
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Research and development at Bell Labs poses no significant 
differences from Western Electric. R&D can be regarded as an input 
that reduces the need for other inputs in the production process. It 
thereby enables a company to threaten lower prices to entrants through 
time, and consequently has rewards beyond the straightforward profit 
calculus when directed at competitive or potentially competitive 
markets. This, too, will not be effectively touched by the separate 
subsidiaries proposal, no matter bow much effort is put into cost­
accounting for R&D, because of the fundamental intractability of the 
problem.20 
In reviewing this section, some of the available strategies 
appear more plausible than others. It seems highly unlikely, for 
example, that AT&T will adopt a strategy like that of Western Union in 
1880: to set monopoly prices against the residual demand curve and 
watch its market wither to nothing. More likely, it has approached 
divestiture with a stiff upper lip (if not the faintest smile), 
especially after the Second Computer Inquiry, because it looks forward 
to growth in the direction of computer-related communications. Here 
tactical decisions will be faced about which new markets are 
promising, which of its current markets are vulnerable, and which are 
protected. AT&T will continue to have an incentive to engage in 
creative accountancy for the purpose of cross-subsidization. MTS will 
be the potential target for loading up the costs, for it is probably 
the regulated service that will be the last to experience serious 
erosion of market share. Separate subsidiaries will provide s0me 
protection -- but not against cross-subsidization through equipment 
prices and research, and not against exclusive dealing, as long as 
AT&T's costs are in the ballpark with the competitors. 
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The extent to which AT&T can follow this strategy is limited, 
though, because MTS has a limit price that is relatively low due to 
the resale and shared use policy of the FCC. This policy does not 
make entry instantaneous and costless, but it does avoid the capital 
investment requirements to get into the MTS business (or a close 
substitute ) if too wide a band opens up between private line and MTS. 
This will keep large intercity markets relatively competitive, but not 
interconnection between markets for which there is no significant 
private line service. The reason is that the competitive fringe 
companies already in the former are in position to enter MTS 
competition if it appears profitable to do so. Thus, AT&T after 
divestiture, and with separate subsidiaries, faces the same incentive 
structure as it did in the early 1970s, when it proposed the "Hi-D, 
Lo-D" tariff structure -- a price structure that would have enabled 
the company to engage in competitive pricing in markets in which entry 
was threatened, but to maintain higher prices elsewhere. Neither 
separate subsidiaries nor divestiture alters the incentives to engage 
in this practice. Whatever incursions have been made against it in 
other regulatory policies (such as resale and shared use) since the 
early 1970s remain the principal limiting forces against propensities 
to engage in predatory pricing. 
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SUMMING UP 
The preceding analysis provides a rationale for the continued 
regulation of AT&T. Part of AT&T will continue to have monopoly 
power, and regulation will continue to succeed in a crude way to limit 
the ability to translate this power to excess profits and high prices. 
In addition, the resale and shared use policies will provide some 
check on price discrimination in larger markets, thereby working to 
limit the possibilities for both predatory pricing and regulation­
induced incentives to pad the rate base by continuing to offer money­
losing services but make up the loss in monopoly services. This 
latter benefit of regulation duplicates antitrust policy; however, the 
slowness and expense of antitrust litigation makes regulation a useful 
weapon in this regard, even if it is no panacea. Whereas regulation 
cannot really prevent cross-subsidization in the price structure of a 
regulated firm, it can limit its extent. Moreover, it does create an 
evidentiary burden on the firm to justify price changes which, among 
other things, generates some of the information that is required for 
an effective antitrust attack. An important part of the successful 
antitrust cases against AT&T during the 1970s was the evidentiary 
trail left by the company's resistance to implementing procompetitive 
decisions by the FCC. During a transition from monopoly to 
competition, regulation and antitrust can be mutually supportive as 
long as the regulator shares the trust-buster's commitment to 
competition as the long-run aim in all markets in which it is 
feasible. 
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The preceding analysis also suggests that there is very little 
positive purpose served by the separate subsidiaries policy in the 
Second Computer Inquiry. Whereas it may offer some barrier to direct 
internal subsidization from the monopoly service to competitive 
services, the vertical integration of AT&T that remains will allow the 
practice to continue indirectly through Western Electric and Bell 
Labs. Divestiture will eliminate the regulation-induced incentives 
for exclusive dealings between the operating companies and the rest 
of AT&T, but not between Long Lines and other divisions of the 
corporation. 
The separate subsidiaries approach has another problem. 
AT&T's perception of the source of its technical advantages is through 
integration in a technical sense. Separation of competitive 
subsidiaries maintains only financial and high-level strategic 
integration, but cuts off coordination at the working level. Thus, if 
there is an economy of scope from coordination of the elements of 
telecommunications services and products, separate subsidiaries erect 
a barrier against it. 
If the separate subsidiaries proposal is not a particularly 
useful idea, what then? The key choice is between allowing AT&T to 
become a regulated monopoly and a partly unregulated competitor, or 
attempting to confine AT&T to purely monopoly services. If there 
really were a large, growing, technically challenging natural monopoly 
in, say, MTS that was well-defined and policeable, the latter strategy 
might have some appeal. Or, if AT&T were not as active and productive 
in co11DDunications R&D, the latter choice would also stand out. In 
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either case, there would not be much of a sacrifice to try to maintain 
a clean separation between what is mildly regulatable and naturally 
monopolistic and what is competitive and, therefore, a poor choice for 
regulation. The choice is difficult, however, because neither 
condition is true. AT&T as a research entity is an important national 
resource that ought to be employed as effectively as possible. 
Confining the company to a small or nonexistent and dwindling monopoly 
market will inhibit the effective use of this research resource. 
A final observation seems to me to tip the scales conclusively 
in one direction. The principal major competitor to AT&T by 1990 is 
likely to be not the struggling competitive fringe of 1980, but the 
computer industry -- and IBM in particular. The financial and 
technical strength of these competitors makes them less vulnerable to 
anticompetitive practices than the early specialized common carriers 
were. This is not to say that such practices no longer become an 
attractive strategy for a dominant partially-regulated monopoly; just 
that they will be less effective both as generators of effective 
protection of market share and as sources of short-run profit. 
Thus, the conclusion I reach is that AT&T should continue to 
be regulated, but should be permitted to enter essentially any market 
it wants. The separate subsidiaries feature is in my opinion a 
relatively unimportant symbolic act. My guess would be that it will 
not affect the next decade of developments in the industry in any 
perceptable way: it will remove little opportunity for 
anticompetitive behavior, and I suspect that formal managerial and 
accounting separation will not prove that great a deterrence to 
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technical interchange, even if there is a rule against it. As long as 
the FCC continues to maintain regulatory oversight of AT&T, its likely 
corporate strategy is almost certain to be to preserve market share 
rather than to capture dwindling monopoly rents while experiencing 
declining market share. And, it is likely to continue to engage in 
controversial activities relating to relationships among its 
components that will be widely interpretted as anticompetitive. 
Indeed, a third wave of antitrust activities in the late 1980s is a 
distinct possibility. 
This course is preferable to the policy of keeping AT&T out of 
competitive markets computer services and interconnect other than 
MTS -- because there exists no plausible evidence that an integrated 
firm has no technical advantages in some dimensions of this market. 
The lesson of the 1970s is the futility of attempting to draw lines 
that separate components of the telecOllllllunications and computation 
businesses. Technology is too integrated, and moving too quickly, to 
be coped with at all well by the imperfect, slowly reacting regulatory 
process, let alone by the Congressional system. If a "live and let 
live" policy (with scowls at AT&T to keep some semblance of control 
over its strategy) does not work, further actions can come later. 
This will not be terribly comforting to the early entrants, of course, 
but the other side is that the anticompetitive strategy of the 1970s 
did not keep them out � it merely slowed them down. AT&T is 
substantially less well positioned in the 1980s to erect effective 
entry barriers and to engage in predatory pricing than it was in 1970, 
so it is not to me plausible that the very existence of competition is 
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threatened by the new regime. 
And what about the choice of a long-run structure if and when 
the next wave of antitrust washes over the industry? It is probably 
to undertake the form of divestiture that should have been undertaken 
as the outcome of the last antitrust case. This would have left AT&T 
with a "small" operating company (e.g. GT&E-sized, or 5 to 10 percent 
of the market) and with part, but not all of Long Lines, Bell Labs and 
Western Electric. The remainder of Long Lines, Bell Labs and Western 
Electric could also be combined, creating two well-positioned 
companies with integrated manufacturing and interconnection, and 
perhaps a small operating company. As with the actual settlement, 
most operating companies would be made independent. Neither of the 
new integrated companies, of course, would be confined to remain a 
regional company not competing with the other; both could encroach on 
the turf of the other. The details of how this would be done, and 
what it would imply about the exact dismemberment of Bell Labs, will 
not be described here. If there is a point to integration, this 
restructuring would have preserved it and provided a test for its 
superiority. Suffice to say that the problems and issues in this 
paper would not be so interesting � and puzzling � if divestiture 
had made the starting point two versions of AT&T, rather than one. 
The problem with this idea, of course, is that it conceivably could 
cause a significant loss of integration efficiencies; however, one 
would still end up with two very large companies, at least one of 
which would be larger than Long Lines, Bell Labs and Western Electric 
combined were fifteen to twenty years ago. 
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Such a restructuring will come about only if today's potential 
competitors do not become actual ones. It would be triggered by a 
failed or only partially successful entry attempt by competitors to 
set up reasonably integrated but perhaps specialized national 
networks, combined with a continuation of AT&T practices like those of 
the 1970s to inhibit entry. 
Such an outcome cannot be predicted as likely. More likely is 
that entry will be successful, either because AT&T perceives its 
corporate interest to be one of a few integrated telecommunications 
firms, or because the strategies available today for creating entry 
barriers will not prove to be very effective. But it is possible; 
further divestiture can be held as a trump card by political leaders 
who are skeptical about a relatively loose approach to AT&T. 
The possibility that anticompetitive strategies will be 
effective seems less threatening to the future development of the 
industry at this juncture than would be the alternative: to turn the 
game exclusively over to the competitors. The reason is that the 
latter runs the risk of neoprotectionism � of simply changing the 
objects of protection against competition from AT&T in the 1950s and 
1960s to the other common carriers in the 19 80s. Moreover, with big 
firms like IBM and Xerox ready to move in, the focus of protection 
will not fix solely on restraining AT&T, but on keeping the other big 
firms in check as well. 
Despite all of the problems about corporate battles for 
position through courts, Congress and state and federal regulatory 
processes, the 1970s was, nevertheless, a decade of growth, progress 
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and increasing "honest" competition in telecommunications. This ought 
to tell us a lot about the value of structuring the future so that all 
the players with a potentially important contribution can remain in 
the game. 
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